The Record of Dead AI Products
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Essay · May 8, 2026 · 9 min read

The AI healthcare cohort that didn't make it

Six companies, more than three billion dollars, and a category that the system rejected.

On January 21, 2022, IBM announced the sale of what was left of Watson Health to the private equity firm Francisco Partners. IBM did not disclose the price then; its next quarterly filing put it at $1.065 billion. The business was carved out and rebranded as Merative. The sale was the first of six obituaries that would run between 2022 and late 2024, covering more than $3.2 billion in disclosed venture funding and one corporate division.

The five startups that followed Watson out of the category were not fringe operators. Mindstrong Health had raised $160 million from General Catalyst, ARCH, and Foresite. Pear Therapeutics had raised $396 million and gone public through a SPAC that valued it at $1.6 billion. Babylon Health had raised $1.15 billion and gone public at $4.2 billion. Olive AI had raised $902 million at a peak valuation of $4 billion. Forward Health had raised $657 million from Founders Fund, Khosla, SoftBank, and a roster of celebrity angels. They were not the same company. They had, on inspection, the same problem.

Mindstrong was the cleanest version of the early thesis. Founded in 2014 by Paul Dagum, Rick Klausner, and the former NIMH director Tom Insel, the company proposed to read mental illness off a smartphone, treating keystroke cadence and scroll patterns as digital biomarkers for depression and relapse. The science papers were real. The product, when it shipped, was a telehealth therapy app with a passive sensing layer. By the time Mindstrong wound down on March 10, 2023, it was selling sessions, not signals. SonderMind bought the remaining technology and the brand quietly disappeared.

Pear Therapeutics was supposed to be the company that proved the regulatory path. Its lead product, reSET, received FDA de novo clearance in September 2017 as the first prescription digital therapeutic for substance use disorder. Somryst, for chronic insomnia, followed. By 2021 Pear had three cleared products and a SPAC deal with Thimble Point Acquisition. Pear shut down on April 7, 2023. The clearance was real. The reimbursement was not. Commercial insurers, citing weak real-world evidence and the absence of an established code path, declined to pay at scale.

Babylon Health is the case study for what happens when a chatbot meets a payer contract. Founded in London in 2013 by Ali Parsa, Babylon ran an AI symptom checker, an NHS-contracted virtual GP service called GP at Hand, and a US business built on capitated Medicaid and Medicare Advantage deals. The SPAC merger with Alkuri Global closed in October 2021 at a $4.2 billion pro forma equity value. Babylon's services ended in August 2023, and its UK business and assets were later sold to eMed.

Olive AI told a different story and ended in the same place. Founded in Columbus in 2012 by Sean Lane, Olive sold an AI worker for hospital back-office tasks, prior authorization, claims status checks, eligibility, revenue cycle. The pitch was that automation software, presented as a digital worker named Olive, would let health systems shed administrative cost. Olive sold off two product lines in 2023 and shut the rest of the business on October 31, 2023. The peak valuation, set in 2021, had been $4 billion.

Forward Health was the last of the cohort and in some ways the most theatrical. Adrian Aoun, a former Google special-projects lead, founded Forward in 2016 as a membership primary care clinic, $149 a month, body scanners in the lobby, a software-first medical record. In November 2023 Forward announced the CarePod, a self-contained AI-powered medical booth meant to deliver primary care without a clinician in the room, and a $100 million round to build them. The pods were deployed in malls and offices. On November 12, 2024, Forward closed every location.

Read together, the six failures rhyme on three points. The first is the gap between FDA clearance and insurer reimbursement, which turned out to be wider and meaner than the pitch decks assumed. A de novo clearance, as Pear discovered, is a permission slip to sell, not a contract to be paid. Commercial payers want randomized evidence, a CPT or HCPCS code, and a comparator. The prescription digital therapeutics category never got a stable code. Without one, every sale was a custom negotiation, and custom negotiations do not scale to the unit economics of a venture-backed company.

The second common thread is the cost of capital. Pear, Babylon, and the late-stage rounds at Olive and Forward all priced off a 2020 to 2021 environment in which SPAC sponsors, crossover funds, and growth-stage investors were willing to underwrite long paths to profitability at double-digit revenue multiples. When the Fed began raising rates in March 2022, that market closed. Companies that had been built to raise a $300 million round in 18 months suddenly had to extend their runway by cutting the operating model that the round had been built to fund.

The third thread, and the one most often missed in the post-mortems, is hospital procurement. Health systems are not a market in the way that small businesses or consumers are a market. They are a set of committees, value analysis groups, IT security reviews, compliance officers, and CFOs who will, when sufficiently annoyed, kill any pilot before it touches a production system. By 2022, the buyer was suspicious before the first demo.

Forward's collapse looked, on the surface, like a hardware story. The CarePods, photographed in glossy press tours, had the aesthetic of an Apple Store crossed with an MRI suite. The actual story was more boring. Primary care, as practiced, depends on a clinician taking a history, examining a patient, ordering tests, and following up. Forward built a kiosk that automated the middle steps and left the others unstaffed. The kiosk could not, by itself, write a controlled substance prescription or manage a complex chronic patient.

The combined disclosed funding across Mindstrong, Pear, Babylon, Olive, and Forward comes to roughly $3.265 billion. None of the six companies survived as an independent operator. Watson's assets live on inside Merative. Mindstrong's tech sits inside SonderMind. Olive's remaining product lines were absorbed by Waystar and Humata Health.

What the category demonstrated, in expensive detail, is that healthcare punishes the parts of a software business that are usually its strengths. Speed of iteration runs into regulatory review. Network effects run into hospital procurement. Marketing claims run into clinical evidence requirements. A growth-stage round of $200 million, deployed into a product that cannot get a billing code, does not buy time. It buys a longer obituary. The builders, investors, and operators who lived through this cohort are the ones now making the next round of decisions in the category, with, one hopes, a more accurate map of where the bodies are.

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